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ABSTRACT 
 
EVALUATION OF A KOREAN MICROFINANCE PROGRAM: 
THE SAEMAUL CREDIT COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT 
 IN THE 1960S AND 1970S 
 
By 
 
SIM, WOO JONG 
 
The purpose of this study is to reveal whether the Saemaul Credit Cooperative 
(hereinafter SMC) Movement, the Korea’s representative microfinance movement, was 
successful and can serve as a model for development cooperation. To do that, this research 
evaluated whether there is positive impacts of SMC on income increase or poverty reduction 
of Korean rural area in 1970s. Through regression analyses, this research showed SMC gave 
positive effects not only on income increase of the rural people, but also Saemaul Movement 
(hereinafter SMU). After that, this research revealed what features of SMC make difference 
from other MFIs, especially comparing with Grameen Bank. They are nationwide movement, 
self-reliant, self-established, and bottom-up movement, saving-oriented movement, micro-
credit movement (with small & credit loans, sound purpose, and low interest rate), education-
first movement, and virtuous circle movement through income increase projects. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to reveal whether the Saemaul Credit Cooperative 
(hereinafter SMC) Movement, the Korea’s representative microfinance (MF) movement, was 
successful and can serve as a model for development cooperation. In fact, according to many 
anecdotes, microfinance is known as playing an important role in reducing poverty and 
establishing economic viability for have-nots. However, microfinance has continuously 
caused a stir in its impact evaluation, regarding selection bias, failure of controlling variables, 
etc. Nonetheless, there were few suggesting an alternative. 
Because of that, this study will show a good case on the evaluation of a MF movement, 
which was delivered about 50 years ago in Korea’s rural area and is currently underway. The 
evaluation of this study will be based on statistical analyses rather than anecdotes. “That is 
because the anecdotes are culled to show the potential of microfinance, while the statistical 
analyses are designed to show typical impacts across the board.” (Armendariz and Morduch 
2010) Through this analytic evaluation, this study will show how successful SMC was, in 
other words, how much SMC contributed to poverty reduction in Korean rural areas in the 
1960s and 1970s. And after that, this study will reveal the features which have made such a 
successful story, mainly comparing with another successful case, Grameen Bank.  
Therefore, the research hypothesis of this study is that the SMC Movement had 
successfully reduced poverty and improved the economic viability of the rural people. In fact, 
during the 1960 – 1970 Korean economic development periods, the SMC Movement played a 
pivotal role in reducing poverty and improving economic viability of the poor, especially in 
the rural areas. And the second hypothesis is that there are several features for the success of 
SMC. 
To do that, this research uses regression analyses and descriptive analyses. As indicators 
for assessing this microfinance institution (MFI), this research evaluates whether SMC 
reduced rural poverty and improved rural household income or how much it did. 
The next section offers a brief literature review on the estimation of MFIs and the 
discussion of MF’s pros and cons. The third section describes the variables and methodology 
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to prove the hypothesis of this study; the following section is the result of an empirical 
analysis. And after that this research shows several features for the success of SMC. The last 
section is a conclusion and recommendations of this research. 
 
 
Ⅱ. Literature Review 
 
There are many studies on MFIs, especially on the Grameen Bank. For a start, this study 
scans these previous studies and checks the concept and role of microfinance. And then, we 
will look into discussions of the pros and cons of the effectiveness of the Grameen Bank. And 
finally, we will show why the study on SMC is necessary. 
 
1. Concept and Role of Microfinance 
   Microfinance enhances the accessibility of financial services for the poor in remote rural 
areas. Otero (1999) defines Microfinance as “the provision of financial services to low-
income poor and very poor self-employed people.” In general, microfinance contains various 
kinds of financial services such as loans, saving, and insurance. According to Ledgerwood 
(1999), microfinance services “generally include savings and credit, but can also include 
other financial services such as insurance and payment services." 
   Meanwhile, microfinance plays an important role in reducing poverty and establishing 
economic viability for have-nots. UNCDF (2004) states that  
Studies have shown that microfinance plays three key roles in development. It (i) 
helps very poor households meet basic needs and protects against risks; (ii) is 
associated with improvements in household economic welfare; (iii) helps to 
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empower women by supporting women’s economic participation and so promotes 
gender equity. 
And also, Otero (1999) illustrates that, “microfinance creates access to productive capital 
for the poor, which together with human capital, addressed through education and training, 
and social capital, achieved through local organization-building, enables people to move out 
of poverty.”  
More recently, Simanowitz and Brody (2004) stated that, “Microfinance is a key strategy 
in reaching the MDGs and in building global financial systems that meet the needs of the 
most poor people.”  
After all, if we put aside the empirical verification, it is common sense that microfinance 
is one of the most useful methods to help the poor and one of the most important issues to be 
discussed in the development arena. 
 
2. Effectiveness of MF: Case of Grameen Bank (GB) 
Among many MFIs, the most well-known institution is the Grameen Bank. Especially 
after 2oo6 when the Grameen Bank and its founder, Muhammad Yunus, won the Nobel Prize, 
“Yunus and the Grameen Bank began to prove that microfinance is a viable method to 
alleviate poverty.” (Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008) And most studies on Grameen Bank have 
evaluated it as the most successful MF model. Because of that, many ODA organizations 
have followed the Grameen Bank model to replicate it in other developing countries. As a 
result, the Grameen Bank’s model of microcredit, along with its vision of empowering the 
poor, has drawn widespread recognition in recent decades and is being adopted by many 
countries around the globe. (Yasushi Suzuki 2011) 
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The Grameen Bank model, however, has some problems such as its subsidy dependency 
and weak sustainability. For instance, revealing GB's adjusted default rate (7.8%), Morduch 
(1999) raises the important issue of validation and at last makes the point that "the rate is still 
impressive relative to the performance of government development banks, but it is high 
enough to start creating financial difficulties in GB.” (Morduch 1999, 1590) 
In spite of these ambiguities regarding GB’s effectiveness and sustainability, many MFIs 
have followed the GB model. This phenomenon has resulted in some skepticism on MF 
movement in the international development arena. The main reason of this happening is that 
there is no objective, statistical, and wholly acceptable analyses on the effectiveness of MF. 
In other words, “There is no study yet that has achieved wide consensus as to its reliability.” 
(Armendariz and Morduch 2005) As a result, it is highly required to conduct the well-
designed analysis, find an effective model, and benchmark it. 
 
3. One of the Most Successful Microfinance Cases: the SMC Movement 
In spite of these debates on the effectiveness of Grameen Bank or MFI, Korea has her 
own successful microfinance case: the SMC Movement. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean 
economic development period, the SMC Movement played a pivotal role in alleviating 
poverty, especially in the rural area of the country. When it comes to the history of 
microfinance, however, researchers have not shed any light on the SMC Movement as a 
microfinance model. Even according to many researchers such as Robinson (2001) and Otero 
(1999), microfinance is regarded as first coming to prominence in the 1970s, whereas the 
SMC was originated in the early 1960s and showed rapid growth in the 1970s. 
SMC was first established in South Gyeongsang province in South Korea. As a matter of 
fact, SMC is a sort of credit cooperative. Hence, like other credit cooperatives, SMC was 
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also influenced by western cooperative like Germany’s Raiffeisen and Canada’s Antigonish 
in the early 1960s. SMC, however, has very different characteristics from those western 
cooperatives. When they accepted the ideology from the West, Koreans integrated it with 
indigenous Korean customs like Gye, Hyangyak, and Doorae, 1  which are kinds of 
community contract to enhance community member’s economic, social status by using 
community’s blood tie and cooperation. And they recreated their own ideology and system. 
That is SMC. Based on its traditional background, SMC could easily reach out to people in 
rural area and achieve its goal: rural income increase through poverty reduction and 
empowerment (capacity building). At the time, as a result, SMCs were a key source of credit 
for farmers. (Kim, Joonkyung 2013) 
 
[Figure 2-1] Origin of SMC 
 
 
And also, the SMC received few subsidies from the government. Furthermore, the SMC 
has sustainably developed so that the company has more than three thousand branch offices 
                                           
1 Gye : sort of private fund, whose members chip in a small amount of money and take 
turns to receive a lump sum share 
Doorae : kind of labor cooperation among farmers 
Hyangyak : social contract 
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nationwide and its members include one third of the Korean People. In other words, the SMC 
Movement appears to be one of the most successful microfinance models in Korea.2 
 
4. SMC: Evidence of the successful microfinance movement? 
Based on outstanding outcomes such as its performance, socio-economic impacts on rural 
households, and its financial sustainability, the SMC could be considered apparent proof of 
the success of the microfinance movement. 
My initial investigation, however, has found that there has been little research on the 
SMC Movement, especially from the perspective of microfinance. Even though there are 
some studies, they focused on specific topics: development strategy of SMC (Whang 1991); 
SMC's role in constructing modern welfare society (Whang 1990); and promoting the local 
economy (Choi et al. 2007). At best, there is a study comparing similarities and differences 
between microfinance and credit cooperatives (Jang 2011). Park et al.(2005) attempted a 
quantitative analysis on regional income increase by using the number of financial 
institutions like SMC for the first time, but the target period is after 1998 and the analysis was 
not only for SMC, because other banks were considered together with SMC. There are also 
other studies on SMC’s impact on income increase like Bae (1975) and Woo (1998). 
However, their studies are focused on several villages, thus they are short of samples. Rather, 
Hong(1975)’s samples are more broad. Nevertheless, his analysis has also some limits in that 
the sample area is restricted in Jeonbuk province and research methods depend only on 
survey.  
More recently, in his paper, Kim, Jungho (2013) said “A community credit union [SMC] 
plays a vital role in all the economic activities and the accumulation of assets in a rural area.” 
                                           
2 SMC’s members reached out 15 million as of the end of 2013. 
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However, his paper just aimed at examining how much Village Leader Training Program 
could influence the performance of SMC. In a nutshell, in spite of its successful outcomes, 
there is no research to verify the effectiveness of the SMC Movement in terms of its MF 
activities.  
Against this backdrop, therefore, the purpose of this study is to reveal how much the 
SMC (MF) Movement was successful and to define what the main factors are contributing to 
the success, based on the quantitative analysis and simple tabular analyses. 
 
 
Ⅲ. Empirical Analysis 
1. Methodology 
In the late 1970s, as Figure 3-1 is showing, income per household was abruptly increased. 
At the same time, income per rural household even exceeded urban household’s one in 1974. 
This means that some factors caused the abrupt increase of household income, especially 
rural household income. 
 
 [Figure 3-1] Income per household  
 (Unit: 10,000 KRW) 
 
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (1980) 
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 In this context, rural savings distribution (as shown in Table 3-1) suggests meaningful 
message. Among the whole rural savings, the share of SMC has continuously increased and 
ended up exceeding that of Agri-fishery Co-ops in the late 1970s. It means that there is a 
possibility for SMC and rural household income to be correlated.  
 
[Table 3-1] Rural savings distribution 
                                         (Unit : 1,000 million KRW) 
Year SMC(A) Agri-fishery Co-ops(B) A/B(%) 
1971 2.7 (100.0) 
18 
(100.0) 15 
1972 3.6 (129.6) 
15.3 
(85.0) 24 
1973 6.5 (240.7) 
35.9 
(199.4) 18 
1974 3.4 (125.9) 
56.0 
(311.1) 6 
1975 7.4 (270.1) 
77.7 
(431.7) 10 
1976 22.2 (822.2) 
113.9 
(632.8) 19 
1977 71.1 (2,633.3) 
185.5 
(1,030.6) 38 
1978 240.0 (8,888.9) 
212.4 
(1,180.6) 113 
                Note: Parentheses means index based on 1971    
                Source: Revised table from Hwang (1980). 
 
 When we consider the number of SMC’s members and offices (see Figure 3-2), we can 
find some similar trend with the path of rural household income. As a result, we can assume 
that there is some relationship between income per rural household and SMC. Against this 
backdrop of correlation between two, this research will reveal if SMC contributed to reduce 
poverty and enhance income per rural household in 1970s.  
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[Figure 3-2] SMC’s members and offices 
 
 
      Source: SMC statistics 
 
To reveal such SMC (MF) effectiveness on rural income increases, this research will 
evaluate whether there is a positive relationship between the income level of a rural 
community and SMC activities of the same community in 1970s.3 To do so, this research 
considers a specific model as follow: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
     “where the dependent variable 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 means the income of a region i in a specific 
time period: year t and 𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 stands for the amount of SMC’s asset, which 
serves as the main independent variable of the model; 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 means other 
independent variables, which can be considered as influential factors for 
                                           
3 In the case of the 1960s, there is lack of data. So, in chapter Ⅲ. Empirical Analysis, this 
research just focused on the 1970s. 
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income increases like the number of household stocks, farming equipment, 
cultivating areas, human capital, etc. and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  stands for the error term.” 
If there is some positive impact of SMC on rural income increase, 𝛽2 > 0 will be likely 
to be expected from the above formula. 
 
2. Data 
 2.1. Dependent Variables: Income Indices 
For the dependent variable, which stands for rural income, average income per household 
or rural household by Goon4 unit is needed. Unfortunately, however, there is no specific data 
regarding rural income in 1970s. As a substitute data, this paper will use 1) the ratio of self-
reliant village to the total number of villages and 2) the rice productivity, following Kim 
Jungho (2013)’s paper.  
Self-reliant village was one of the criteria for classification of village by the government 
in 1970s. To be the self-reliant village, average annual income per household had to be over 
1.4 million won.(see Table 3-2) According to this criteria, Kim Jungho(2013, 789) concluded 
“When income standard exists as promoting requirement, village level index can be 
interpreted to economic index.”5 
 
 
                                           
4 Goon is the administrative unit of district in Korea. 
5 Kim Jung-ho(2013) said “Of course, applying real income allowed inflation rate for exact 
income index is a limitation.” 
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[Table 3-2] Criteria for Classification of Village 
Project Required Factors Self-help Village  Self-reliant Village  
1. Farm Roads  
• Completion of Main Roads  • Completion of Main Roads  
• Reconstruction of Village Roads  • Building Of Bridges Shorter than 
20 Meters Each  
2. Housing Environment  • Roof Ameliorating: over 70%  • Roof-Remodeling: over 80%  • Reconstruction of Main Ditches  • Fence-Remodeling: over 80%  
3. Farming base  
• Irrigation of Farmland: over 70%  • Farmland Irrigation: over 85%  
• Arranging of Small Rivers in 
Villages  
• Remodeling of Small Rivers 
around Villages  
4. Cooperation Level  
• Community Hall, Storehouse, 
Workshop, etc.: More than One  
• Building More than Two among 
Village Hall, Storehouse, 
Workshop, etc.  
• Village Fund: over 500,000 Won  • Village Fund over One Million 
Won 
5. Income Projects  
• Community Income Project: 
More than One  
• Development of Non-farm 
Income Source  
• Average Annual Income per 
Household: over 800,000 Won  
• Average Annual Income per 
Household: over 1.4 Million 
Won  
     Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (1980) 
 
  Since this village level index was used by the government to evaluate the village’s 
performance in [of] Saemaul Movement [by government], 1) the ratio of self-reliant village 
can be used as a dependent variable representing the level of income of the community. 
Regarding the rice productivity, Kim Jungho (2013, 818) also maintained: “Since rice is 
the single most important crop, its productivity can be interpreted as an indicator of the 
economic well-being in rural areas. In addition, the rice productivity is a real index rather 
than a nominal one, which implies that it does not need to be adjusted by the price level in 
areas or periods”. 
The data 1) the ratio of Self-reliant village is taken from Goon Unit Yearbook 
Database(2013) and the data 2) the rice productivity is assembled from Year Book of 
Agriculture and Forestry Statistics(1974~77).  
 
 
12 
 
2.2. Independent Variable: the Asset of SMC 
   The main independent variable is the asset of SMC. Because asset of financial institution 
contains the size of outstanding loans, the asset of SMC can be a barometer of SMC’s 
performance as a MFI. Based on Amos & Wingender (1993)’s empirical analysis that 
regional gross products is influenced by banks’ loan in the US and Koo & Kim (1999) and 
Park et al.(2005)’s findings that financial development results in regional development, it is 
easily assumed that the size of the asset of SMC is a main factor for increasing income of a 
rural community. 
Like the ratio of Self-reliant village, the data regarding the asset of SMC was [could be] 
also taken from Goon Unit Yearbook Database (2013). The data is concentrated in the late 
1970s and even scattered in different Goon and different year. For instance, some Goon has 
its data of SMC’s asset for 6 consecutive years from 1974 to 1980, but the other Goon has 
just one data in 1978. And also, according to Goon Unit Yearbook Database (2013), the data 
is not only categorized by SMC’s asset but also by SMC’s performance. Nonetheless, the 
data of SMC’s performance can be substituted as the asset data, considering that the 
performance means balance sheets of SMCs and, therefore, some Goons alternately used both 
“performance” and “asset” to record the result of SMCs. 
 
2.3. Other Control Variables  
   What other factors can also effect on the regional income? In fact, there isn’t enough data 
to use regarding this paper because of the lack of database in Korean statistics in 1970s. 
Fortunately, however, there are some data by Goon unit in Year Book of Agriculture and 
Forestry Statistics published by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Among that data, this 
paper chooses the relevant data with income from Year Book of Agriculture and Forestry 
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Statistics (1974~80) such as working-age population as human capital, number of cow, 
farming equipment, cultivating land and length of expanded village road. This selection of 
data is based on various theories regarding economic growth like endogenous growth theory, 
production function theory, etc. This way of data selection was already used by Park et al. 
(2005) 
 
2.4. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
   As a whole, the variables are unbalanced panel data of 19 aggregatable Goons during 7 
years (from 1974 to 1980). For standardization, all independent variables are substituted as 
the value per 1,000 persons. Table 3-3 is the summary of the above explanation on 
independent variables.  
 
[Table 3-3] Independent Variables for Rural Income  
Variable Variable coding Source 
SMC SMC’s asset size /population Goon Unit Yearbook 
Database(2013) Road Expanded roads /population 
Work force 14~59 ages/population 
Year Book of 
Agriculture and 
Forestry Statistics 
(1974~80) 
 
N.cow Number of cow /population 
Equip Number of equipment /population 
Field Farming field /population 
Pure farm Number of Pure farmer /population 
Note: ‘Pure farm’ means the number of full-time farmer and part-time farmer whose  
agriculture income is more than 50% of total annual income. 
 
And also, Table 3-4 shows the simple description on statistics of variables.  
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 [Table 3-4] Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 N Unit Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Village 46 % 33.00 100.00 73.5000 17.50905 
Rice 22 kg/1,000 persons 176 520 404.64 75.479 
SMC 
 
Road 
50 
 
50 
1,000 KRW 
/1,000 persons 
km/1,000 persons 
101.00 
 
.00 
21411.00 
 
9286.57 
5689.9400 
 
710.9852 
4705.29218 
 
1816.63778 
Work force 
 
50 persons 
/1,000 persons 
51918.00 136782.00 88674.7800 21266.92749 
N. cow 50 unit/1,000 persons 64.00 283.00 111.0000 47.10865 
Equipment 47 unit/1,000 persons 2.00 112.00 15.5106 18.19445 
Field 50 ha/1,000 persons 83.00 283.00 167.9200 43.00064 
Pure farm 
 
50 persons 
/1,000 persons 
480.00 973.00 900.7400 90.54367 
Valid N (listwise) 18      
 
3. Result of Analysis 
 3.1. SMC for rural income   
[Table 3-5] Regression Results 
Independent 
variables 
SMC Road 
Work 
force 
N.cow Equip Field 
Pure 
farm 
N 
Goon 
(郡) 
R- 
squared 
Dependent 
variables 
Village 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.78 
(0.112) 
0.027 
(0.055) 
0.477** 
(0.186) 
-0.011 
(0.110) 
0.022 
(0.042) 
46 19 0.414 
Rice 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
0.518 
(0.503) 
-0.713 
(0.643) 
-1.340* 
(0.630) 
0.253 
(0.305) 
-0.176 
(0.147) 
22 15 0.860 
Note: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis 
 
   As this study anticipated, SMC has positive impact on income increases of the rural 
people, the variable SMC has a significant coefficient at 5% level in the case of the ratio of 
self-reliant village and at 1% level in the case of rice productivity. According to this results, 
when the asset of SMC per 1,000 persons increases by 1,000 KRW, the ratio of self-reliant 
village and the rice productivity of Goon increase by 0.1% and 2.4%, respectively. 
 
15 
 
   Regarding equipment variable, the results show opposite impacts on the income increase 
in the case of the ratio of self-reliant village and the productivity of rice respectively. 
Moreover, road expansion variable shows the gap of significant level. This result raises the 
possibility of biased assumption that all independent variables are exogenous.      
Therefore, this research conducts another analysis; two stage least squares regression analysis 
(TSLS). In this TSLS, independent variables are equipment and road expansion variables 
with the possibility that they are endogenous, while other remaining variables are 
instrumental variables. Table 3-6 shows the result of that analysis in the case of the ratio of 
self-reliant village, i.e., the equipment variable has a significant positive coefficient at the 10% 
level. When it comes to the productivity of rice dependent variable, the all variables are not 
significant.  
 
[Table 3-6] TSLS Results 
Independent 
variables 
Equip Road N 
Goon 
(郡) 
R- 
squared 
Dependent 
variables 
Village 
0.657* 
(0.356) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
46 19 0.13 
Rice 
-0.972 
(0.892) 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
22 15 0.25 
Note: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
 
   Meanwhile, regarding expanded roads variable, it shows negative impacts on the income 
increase at every stage of analyses. This can be interpreted that the more the region is poor, 
the more there are roads to be expanded, because this variable shows the performance of 
length of expanded roads in some year.   
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3.2. SMC for SMU   
   Category 1,2,3 and 4 of Table 3-2 are all related to performance of the Saemaul 
Movement (SMU). In fact, the ratio of self-reliant village was utilized as indicators showing 
how successful the Saemaul Movement is in the region. Therefore, the result of regression 
result of Table 3-5 also shows the relationship between SMC and SMU. As a result, it would 
be also concluded that SMC gave positive effects on SMU results.  
 
 
Ⅳ. Features of SMC in Comparison with Grameen Bank 
The analysis above shows SMC have meaningful effects on the income of rural people. 
These effects are based on several features of SMC, which are different from other MFIs. 
Therefore, this chapter reveals what the features of SMC are, comparing with other MFIs, 
especially Grameen Bank, which is designated as the most successful MF model. These 
features are the following: nationwide movement, self-reliant, self-established, and bottom-up 
movement, saving-oriented movement, micro-credit movement (with small & credit loans, 
sound purpose, and low interest rate), education-first movement, and virtuous cycle 
movement through income increase projects. 
 
1. Nationwide Movement 
In general, many MFIs have been conducted in some selected area. No microfinance 
program lends to random citizens (Armendariz and Morduch 2010). As a result, their impacts 
are limited in coverage and weak to cover the national needs. On the contrary, SMC was a 
nationwide movement in 1970s. SMCs were established in every rural community at that 
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time. In 1977, the number of SMCs was 42,436, which was similar to the number of towns at 
that time. This means that every single town had its own SMC. In fact , “One Town, One 
SMC” 6 was a slogan of SMC movement.  
 
[Figure 4-1] Number of Members 
     (Unit: Person) 
 
     Source: SMC statistics, Grameen Bank Website    
 
   The Nationwide Movement feature of SMC is more apparent, compared to Grameen 
Bank. As shown in Figure 4-1, SMC and Grameen Bank draw similar shapes of growth when 
it comes to their numbers of members during the first 13years of operation. However, based 
on the ratio of members of population (Figure 4-2), SMC widened its influence on the people 
by around 17%, unlike Grameen Bank’s 1%. This gap was reflected in the opearational result 
as this study already showed in the previous chapter.  
 
 
 
 
                                           
6 This slogan is very similar to “OVOP (One Village, One Product)” projects in recent 
development cooperation fields.  
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[Figure 4-2] Members over Population 
                                                    (Unit: %) 
 
               Note: ‘y’ means the starting year of two organizations respectively.  
               Source: SMC statistics, Grameen Bank Website 
 
2. Self-reliant, Self-established, and Bottom-up Movement  
   To be expanded nationwide as is shown above, only the will of government is not enough. 
Voluntary participation is an essential factor. Furthermore, the problem of ‘aid fatigue’ 
mainly results from recipients’ lack of self-reliance. In this regard, SMC is the best practice 
for the self-reliant, self-established, and bottom-up movement. SMC operation is based on 
internal funding such as shares and savings of its members. In contrast, most MFIs depend on 
external aid for its operation. Therefore, many MFIs cannot be sustainable without the 
continuity in these external funds. In this regard, Adams and Raymond (2008) illustrate, 
"Without subsidies, over 90 percent of microfinance operations would disappear in a few 
years".  
   Of course, there was support from the government or the Korean Federation of 
Community Credit Cooperatives (KFCC), which is the central supervisory institution for 
SMCs. But most support was no more than education or technical consulting. SMCs could 
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only be voluntarily established and developed based on consciousness reform of village 
leaders and villagers through continuous education. Even in the case of financial aid, the aid 
was characteristically meager and temporary. 
 
[Figure 4-3] Subsidy state of SMC & Grameen Bank 
(Unit: 1,000 USD) 
 
     Source: The 25 years history of SMC, Morduch(1999) 
 
   Figure 4-3 shows how small the subsidies SMCs received from the government were, 
especially considering its asset size (1,562 million USD as of the end of 1985). On the other 
hand, Grameen Bank’s subsidy dependency has continuously increased unlike SMC.7 Table 
4-1 shows the size of the subsidy for each institution as a percent of total assets, for instance 
in 1985.  
 
 [Table 4-1] Subsidy dependency ratio of SMC & Grameen Bank 
                        (Unit: %, as of the end of 1985) 
SMC Grameen Bank 
0.2 61.3 
                         Source: SMC statistics, Grameen Bank Website 
 
                                           
7 Grameen Bank’s asset size is 3 million USD as of the end of 1985. 
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   As a financial institution, this causes a severe problem. Considering Grameen Bank’s 
poor performance in terms of Return on Assets (ROA), which has been nearly zero (see 
Figure 4-4), Grameen Bank shows critical weakness when it comes to financial soundness 
and sustainability.  
 
[Figure 4-4] ROA(Return on assets) 
                                                                                 (Unit: %) 
 
       Source: The 25 years history of SMC, Grameen Bank Website 
 
   Analyzing this point, Morduch (1999) also revealed that G.B. had recorded losses and the 
amount of losses had increased every year (see Figure 4-5). Meanwhile, the most famous and 
representative MFI’s poor management result had lots of implications. Other MFIs are not 
much different from Grameen Bank’s case. Thus, this financial dependency mainly results in 
the recent skepticism on MFIs. Against this backdrop, the case of SMC can shed bright light 
on the effectiveness of MFIs.  
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[Figure 4-5] Reported profit and adjusted profit of Grameen Bank 
                                                       (Unit: Million USD) 
 
Source: Morduch (1999) 
 
3. Saving-oriented Movement  
   What makes the largest difference between SMC and other MFIs like Grameen Bank? As 
mentioned above, the biggest difference is that SMC is oriented on saving, whereas other 
MFIs focus on loans. In this regard, SMC is a kind of saving movement rather than just 
micro-credit movement in its widest sense. As a financial institution, the component ratio 
between deposits and loans is very important, because it is highly related with financial 
dependency, and sustainability of the organization. Figure 4-6 shows deposits and loan 
statuses of the two institutions.  
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[Figure 4-6] Deposits & Loan Status 
(Unit: Million KRW, Million USD) 
 
     Source: SMC statistics, Grameen Bank Website 
 
   Like the case of Grameen Bank, as already mentioned above, any financial institution 
cannot help but depend on external aid, if it is without its own savings.  
 
   The representative case showing SMC’s characteristic as a saving movement is the 
‘Squeezed Money Saving’ campaign (see Table 4-2).  
 
 [Table 4-2] Examples of Squeezed Money Saving 
saving by improving lifestyle saving by reforming a way of thinking saving by refraining from fashion items 
- saving by decreasing drink and 
 smoke 
- saving by saving  
 rice (Jom-Do-Ri saving) 
- saving by decreasing haircut cost 
- saving by collecting wastes 
- saving by reducing fares 
- saving in a monthly meeting 
- saving due to diligence 
- saving due to management 
- saving with fixed income 
- saving by reducing household rituals 
 (birthday, marriage, 60th birthday, etc.) 
- saving by joint project 
- saving the 
performance of 
money excluding 
the extravagances 
such as private 
fund, necklace and 
ring consumption 
Source: Sim et al.(2012) 
 
Among ‘Squeezed Money Saving’ campaigns, the most important example is Jom-Do-
Ri saving (rice saving). Jom-Do-Ri saving is a way of saving in which rice was accumulated, 
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spoonful by spoonful, for the purpose of making a source of saving. Every time when 
housewives prepared meals, they would take out one spoonful of rice from a rice-cooking pot 
and put it in a jar placed at the corner of the kitchen for savings. At general assemblies or 
monthly meetings of SMC, housewives would bring the rice pot, and the SMC would take it 
and register it in the rice collection book. In this way, SMC motivated its members to make 
sources of saving in spite of the desperate and destitute situation. This is the most 
representative model of ‘Squeezed Money Saving’. In fact, this type of saving has been 
observed in some LDCs. Based on unique traits of Koreans like patience and perseverance, 
however, this campaign could achieve tangible results. Table 4-3 shows the empirical effects 
which were later reported in the then most influential daily newspaper; “Through the rice 
saving movement, symbolized as Jom-Do-Ri, around 450,000ℓ of rice were collected only in 
1964.”8        
 
[Table 4-3] Jomdori (rice saving) formula 
 
a family of 5 × 2 spoons = 10 spoons a day 
10 spoons × 30 days = 300 spoons a month 
► 300 spoons ÷ 40 spoons (1ℓ) = 7.5ℓ 
                Source: The 50 years history of SMC(2013) 
 
                                           
8 Dong-a Ilbo, April 29, 1965. 
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   By doing so, SMC played a pivotal role in fostering the saving habits of the rural poor. In 
order to alleviate poverty, the important thing is not only to give a loan, but also to nurture 
saving habits in the poor. Without saving habits, the poor have to be dependent on external 
subsidies and it is very difficult for them to help themselves and escape from poverty. As a 
result, these savings could be the seed for the rural to overcome poverty and increase incomes.  
 
4. Micro-credit Movement: Small & Credit Loans, Sound Purpose, and Low Interest Rate 
When it comes to loans, SMC shows many similarities with other MFIs. First, SMC lends 
money on a small loan basis. Therefore, in the then articles of association of SMC, there was 
a clause to give priority to smaller loans when two prospective borrowers compete for the 
loan. 
Second, needless to say, the purpose of loan had to be sound. In addition to the afore-
mentioned goal of MFI, poverty reduction, another important goal of MFIs is to improve the 
economic viability of the poor. To do that, loans can play a role of seed money, that is to say 
a sound purpose of loans. A lot of literatures regarding SMC also emphasize the need for a 
sound purpose for SMC’s loans on the part of the borrower. Table 4-4 shows examples of 
what were considered sound purposes for SMC loans9 and they are very similar to Grameen 
Bank’s. 
 
[Table 4-4] Purposes for loans 
 SMC Grameen Bank 
                                           
9 With the slogan, ‘Let’s just find a business, SMC has enough money to lend’, SMC 
encouraged members to use loan of SMC for the sound purpose (Sim et al. 2012). 
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1 Farming Fund 41% Milk 44% 
2 Business Fund 24% Cow Fattening 31% 
3 Debenture Redemption 11% Grocery Shop 25% 
4 Medical / School Expenses 17% Paddy Husking 0.2% 
5 Etc. 7% Rice/Paddy Trading 0.1% 
     Source: The 25 years history of SMC, Grameen Bank Website  
 
Third, SMC’s loans were mainly small credit loans, while other financial companies 
commonly dealt secured loans. This largely resulted from desperate poverty as SMC’s 
members did not have any property to put up as collateral for loans in those days. Instead, 
with the consideration that there was the risk of a few defaults, SMC set importance on credit 
loans based on personal security, because debtors usually had a sense of community and 
fellowship. This was possible through mutual surveillance among members which resulted 
from the fact that they made a united effort to provide funding for the loans (as mentioned 
under the Saving Oriented Movement part). There was a cognition that “My savings are for 
your loan and your repayment is for my dividend.” (Sim et al., 2012) And also, this cognition 
played a role as a kind of ‘peer pressure’. This peer pressure based on ties of blood and 
region and was somewhat different from Grameen Bank’s artificial grouping.  
Furthermore, since each SMC performed in its own limited area like a clan society which 
is a feature particular to Korean Confucian culture, there was a psychological mechanism of 
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alienation or mutual surveillance in the case of default.10 This was very helpful for SMC’s 
outstanding performances. 
 
[Table 4-5] Lending interest rate 
SMC Grameen Bank 
13% 
(20~25%) 11 ~ 18% 
                      Note: Figure in parenthesis refers to value before adjusted. 
                      Source: The 25 years history of SMC, Grameen Bank Website  
 
Fourth, SMC shows very low lending interest rates, an annual rate of around 20 to 25 
percent11, following the government’s guideline. Admittedly, this rate is little bit higher than 
the reported rate of Grameen bank, an annual rate of around 11 to 18 percent.12 In spite of 
that, it was very helpful for the rural poor who suffered from high rates demanded by loan 
sharks, which ran into an annual rate of around 60~72 percent.13 Besides, the source of 
SMC’s loans was totally different from Grameen bank’s external aid as mentioned above. In 
addition, SMC, through several education programs, induced debtors to amortize rather than 
repay at one time. This encouraged them to repay the loans in a timely fashion. In doing so, 
SMC could raise awareness of “use lump sum money and repay small sum money” slogan14 
and helped members make it a habit to utilize financial services. Likewise, amortization 
reduced the actual interest rate from 25 percent to 13 percent as shown in Table 4-6. 
                                           
10 This psychological mechanism has been equally applied to SMC’s saving, education, and 
even participation in various kinds of SMC driven contributive projects discussed later so that this 
is very helpful for SMC’s outstanding performances. 
11 Sim et al.(2012) 
12 Grameen Bank Website 
13 Lee Myunghwi (2010) 
14 Sim et al.(2012) 
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[Table 4-6] Repayment way and interest rate of SMC 
                                                                      (Unit: KRW) 
Month Principal balances 
Monthly repayments 
Notes 
Principal Interest Total 
1 12,000 1,000 240 1,240  Principal  : 12,000 KRW 
Amortization : 12 months 
Monthly interest : 2% 
 
 
By Monthly Repayments 
Annual interest : 13% 
Monthly : 1.08% 
 
 
 
2 11,000 〃 220 1,220 
3 10,000 〃 200 1,200 
4 9,000 〃 180 1,180 
5 8,000 〃 160 1,160 
6 7,000 〃 140 1,140 
7 6,000 〃 120 1,120 
8 5,000 〃 100 1,100 
9 4,000 〃 80 1,080 
10 3,000 〃 60 1,060 
11 2,000 〃 40 1,040 
12 1,000 〃 20 1,020 
Total - 12,000 1,560 13,560 
      Source: The 25 years history of SMC 
 
5. Education-First Movement 
The most important feature of the SMC movement has been education. As a matter of 
fact, this feature stems from SMC’s characteristic as a cooperative. Unlike SMC, there is no 
special feature concerning education among other MFIs, even Grameen bank. However, 
education was emphasized ahead of other activities such as saving, loans, and even 
establishment of SMCs. Therefore, “Education first, establishment later” was a representative 
slogan of SMC in the 1960s and 1970s. In order to establish an SMC, villagers as well as 
village leaders and accountants-to-be had to participate in regular courses of education. Table 
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4-7 and Table 4-8 show well the amount of education conducted by SMC during the 20 years 
after its beginning. 
 
[Table 4-7] Central Education 
                                                                        (Unit : Person) 
Year Total Basic Professional Manager Special 
Total 141,804 80,610 25,800 18,904 16,490 
1965 743 743    
’66 4,460 859   3,601 
’67 1,332 1,332    
’68 705 705    
’69 2,528 2,528    
’70 3,673 3,673    
’71 5,789 5,789    
’72 4,576 4,576    
’73 9,536 9,536    
’74 2,723 2,723    
’75 2,254 1,250 846 158  
’76 4,999 2,749  1,550 700 
’77 8,068 4,297  2,652 1,119 
’78 8,269 2,818 3,989 904 558 
’79 11,067 5,990 2,130 2,326 621 
’80 11,676 4,419 2,740 2,258 2,259 
’81 11,042 4,806 4,488 964 784 
’82 9,411 6,590 1,564 841 416 
’83 8,346 3,516 2,102 1,468 1,260 
’84 6,944 3,430 1,879 425 1,210 
’85 7,664 2,852 2,002 1,469 1,341 
’86 7,190 2,319 1,734 1,760 1,379 
’87 5,526 1,674 1,598 1,864 390 
’88 3,283 1,438 728 265 852 
Source: The 25 years history of SMC 
 
 [Table 4-8] Regional Education 
                                       (Unit : Person) 
Year Performance Total Note 
1966 129,334 -  
’67 130,122 259,456  
’68 152,844 412,300  
’69 262,271 674,571  
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’70 249,447 924,018  
’71 434,006 1,358,024  
’72 1,186,605 2,544,629  
’73 846,738 3,391,367  
’74 396,757 3,788,124  
’75 368,874 4,156,998  
’76 496,266 4,653,264  
’77 776,478 5,429,742  
’78 943,441 6,373,183  
’79 1,098,977 7,472,160  
’80 885,754 8,357,914  
’81 1,231,269 9,589,183  
’82 1,102,307 10,691,490  
’83 1,469,142 12,160,632  
’84 1,986,605 14,147,237  
’85 2,000,491 16,147,728  
’86 2,281,436 18,429,164  
’87 1,745,440 20,174,604  
’88.6 855,644 21,030,248  
Source: The 25 years history of SMC 
 
Almost 20 million staff members were educated for 20 years and on average, 1 million 
staff members were educated every year. This education was very important for the staff of 
SMC in providing financial services, guidance, and even educating its members again. In the 
early stages of SMC, the devotion and efforts of the staff of SMC like the president and 
accountants, who often worked without pay, were the most important factor in making the 
SMC movement successful. For example, they visited members on a daily basis in order to 
encourage them to save small amounts of money and participate in general meetings or 
monthly meetings of SMC.15 Needless to say, well-educated and motivated staff played a key 
role in creating SMC’s success, and education served as the foundation. 
When it comes to membership, education was a preliminary procedure for becoming a 
member of SMC. In general, members-to-be had to attend 9 hours of class, handling the 
                                           
15 This tradition can be seen as a prototype of SMCs’ current business practice to dispatch 
its staffs in the field to provide financial services like loans, saving, payment, etc. 
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purpose, procedures, rights and obligations of members, etc. Even after being a member, 
there was regular education in general meetings and monthly meetings. Through these 
educational opportunities, SMC could not only announce its news regarding SMC’s 
performance, but also educate members of SMC to be empowered with agricultural skills and 
even democratic procedures. Even in the case of loans, debtors were obliged to receive 
education after, as well as before, getting a loan. In this way, education was a useful method 
for managing the repayment rate. 
 
6. Virtuous Circle Movement through Income Increase Projects 
 
SMC contributed to increasing villagers’ income in direct ways by conducting joint 
income increase businesses such as livestock breeding and joint farming.16 In fact, SMC’s 
Cooperate Social Responsibility (CSR) was not just sharing activities like fund donation, but 
village development activities. As the only representative organization of some villages17, 
SMC led village development projects including environment-improving projects and also 
income increase projects. This had a very important implication in that SMC played a pivotal 
role not only in fund circulation, but also fund generation by starting joint businesses for 
creating additional income apart from the traditional agricultural source of revenue. 18 
Furthermore, these projects could make a virtuous circle for village development as well as 
SMC’s sustainability as Figure 4-7 shows.  
                                           
16 Livestock breeding : pig, chicken, silkworm, cow, etc. 
     Joint farming : sapling (young tree), forestation, vinyl greenhouse, licorice farming, ginseng 
farming, etc. 
17 In a large percentage of cases, the village leader became the president of SMC. 
18 Kim, JoonKyung (2013) also emphasized these activities of SMC as the name of Savings 
Reinvestment Program.  
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[Figure 4-7] Virtuous Circle of SMC 
 
                  Source: Sim et al. (2013, 102) 
 
 
Ⅴ. Conclusion & Recommendation 
 
The purpose of this study is to reveal whether the Saemaul Credit Cooperative (SMC) 
Movement, the Korea’s representative microfinance movement, was successful and can serve 
as a model for development cooperation. To do that, this research evaluated whether there is 
positive impacts of SMC on income increase or poverty reduction in Korean rural area in 
1970s. Through regression analyses, this research showed SMC gave positive effects not only 
on income increase of the rural people, but also SMU.  
After that, this research revealed what features of SMC make difference from other MFIs, 
especially comparing with Grameen Bank. They are nationwide movement, self-reliant, self-
established, and bottom-up movement, saving-oriented movement, micro-credit movement 
32 
 
(with small & credit loans, sound purpose, and low interest rate), education-first movement, 
and virtuous circle movement through income increase projects.  
Such features demonstrate that the SMC is a better MF model than the Grameen Bank, 
the world renowned MF program, which has been benchmarked by many aid agencies around 
the world for development cooperation. Therefore, SMC has a good potential to serve as an 
operational model for future development cooperation programs or projects of Korean aid 
agencies. Of course, it will have to be adjusted to each developing country based on its own 
conditions and background.   
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